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ECRI Commentary No. 10, 11 May 2012 
One of many uncertainties still hanging over Europe’s economic recovery in the hostile 
post-crisis economic environment is how the household sector will cope with the debt 
reduction being sought. As a decade-long trend of generous credit expansion goes into 
reverse, deleveraging in the household sector moves forward, but the trend is far from 
homogeneous across nations. It is expected that household deleveraging will take time 
and that it will require continued policy support to prevent an abrupt retrenchment 
from debt, which could obstruct countries’ recovery.  
In retrospect, we have seen how excessive credit growth can be a powerful predictor of 
financial crises, even though in most major economic downturns it has been ignored or 
reacted to too late. Misaligned credit volume increases created either by over-extended 
monetary policy or by a loose augmentation of credit by the credit multiplier – usually 
through  sophisticated  financial  innovations  –  can  easily  create  asset  bubbles.  Only 
when the boom turns to bust, which usually starts with a sudden market correction in 
one or more asset classes, the comprehension of the situation becomes real and the 
rectification  of  the  highly  leveraged  economy  begins  –  a  process  that  is  far  from 
instantaneous.  Europe’s  debt  crisis  is  just  one  of  many  examples  of  how  toxic  the 
consequences can be when countries have too much debt and far too little growth.    
Although financial innovation has increased access to credit, it has also made the credit 
cycle more volatile. Many observers have traced the emergence of the eurozone debt 
crisis back to historically low interest rates, declining savings rates and credit bubbles 
caused by a rapid accumulation of both public and private debt. Latest ECB data show 
that retail credit growth in the euro area has reversed drastically from pre-crisis levels 
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(Figure  1).  At  peak  level,  the  annual  growth  rate  of  credit  for  mortgages  and 
consumption stood at 12% and 8%, respectively. Mortgage and consumer credit has 
been considered as the main drivers of household sector indebtedness. 
FIGURE 1. ANNUAL CREDIT GROWTH RATES (%) 
Households in the euro area  
             
Note: Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted. 
Source: European Central Bank. 
Rising  asset prices  in  the  pre-crisis  period  allowed  borrowers  to add  debt  without 
increasing leverage. However, declines in asset values, such as property  prices,  has 
propagated the risk associated with elevated household leverage in the aftermath of the 
crisis (Figure 2). The borrowing capacity of many households has become significantly 
constrained by the value declines in collaterals.  
FIGURE 2. HOUSE PRICE INDEX 
Base year 2005 = 100 
          
Source: BIS, ECRI Analysis. 
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There are, however, differences between EU member states to be mentioned when it 
comes  to  the  build-up  of  debt.  In  the  run-up  to  the  crisis,  the  fast-paced  growing 
economies  from  the  Eastern  European  bloc  had  double-digit  credit  growth  figures, 
which allowed them to catch up with Western European countries. Although mature 
economies from Western Europe had less momentum in growth rates, the retail credit 
sector still grew a lot faster than the real economy in the run-up to the crisis. The way 
credit growth has outpaced income and GDP growth has been staggering (Figure 3). In 
recent years, the effect from the crisis and the abrupt reversal of the credit cycle has 
made households more prone to improve their balance sheet. 
 
FIGURE 3. CREDIT TO HOUSEHOLDS, DISPOSABLE INCOME AND 
GDP GROWTH  
Compound average growth rate (CAGR) 2000-07 – Nominal terms  
 
Note:  Credit  to  households  correspond  to  the  aggregate  amount  (stock)  of  consumer  credit, 
housing loans  and  other  loans at  the  end  of the  year  granted by  the resident  MFI  sector  to 
resident households and NPISHs for housing and consumption purposes. 
Source:  European  Credit  Research  Institute  (ECRI),  2011  Statistical  Package  “Lending  to 
households in Europe”, Brussels 2011. 
 
The debt-to-income ratio of households in Ireland has come down from 161% in 2007 to 
122% in 2011. Marginal declines are present in Spain and Greece, while Italy continues 
to sustain its debt-to-income ratio at around 60% (Figure 4). US households have so far 
responded  to  the  crisis  in  a  more  significant  manner.  The  first  default-wave  of 
underwater  mortgages  surely  helped  to  reduce  the  aggregate  debt  level  of  US 
households, but also ambitious policy measures such as refinancing options and write-
downs have played a key role in bringing down the debt level in a more ordinary 
fashion.   
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FIGURE 4. DEBT-TO-INCOME RATIO 
Credit to households relative to disposable income (%) 
  
 
 
 
Index 2007=100 
 
Source:  European  Credit  Research  Institute  (ECRI),  2011  Statistical  Package  “Lending  to 
households in Europe”, Brussels 2011. 
In Europe, one can observe that the process of household deleveraging has started, 
albeit hesitantly, in EU member states worst hit by the crisis. Deleveraging is occurring 
either by an increasing amount of defaulting loans or by debt retirement. Also banks’ 
reluctance to extend credit under these stressed market conditions is contributing to the 
process. The IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report2 forecasts a mild recession for the 
euro  area  in  2012  as  growth  continues  to  be  anaemic.  If  the  economic  recovery  is 
prolonged, it is only likely that deleveraging will accelerate in the years to come.  
 
Household  debt  relative  to  GDP  demonstrates  a heterogeneous  trend  in  household 
deleveraging (Figure 5). For example, countries such as Ireland, Iceland, Latvia and 
Lithuania, whose households accumulated a great part of their outstanding debt during 
the boom period, have witnessed a pronounced debt retrenchment where deleveraging 
is being clearly manifested. On the other hand, deleveraging by households in southern 
                                                              
2 Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2012 
(http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2012/01/index.htm). 
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European countries, such as Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece, continues to be sluggish. 
However, on a standalone basis, it is hard to find consensus regarding how much debt 
is considered to be sustainable for a single country. Sweden and the Netherlands are a 
prime example of two countries where deleveraging is still non-existent, despite high 
levels of household debt. Nonetheless, concern over household over-indebtedness is 
still relevant. In fact, policy-makers in Sweden imposed an 85% loan-to–value cap on 
mortgages in October 2010, as a response to its buoyant property market, which has 
been one of the few where house prices did not adjust downwards during the crisis.   
FIGURE 5. HOUSEHOLD DELEVERAGING 
Household debt relative to GDP (%) 
 
Source:  European  Credit  Research  Institute  (ECRI),  2011  Statistical  Package  “Lending  to 
households in Europe”, Brussels 2011. 
Historical experience suggests that deleveraging is indeed a slow process and more is 
likely to come before balance sheets are fully repaired across the household sector in 
Europe. If debt levels of the household sector would need to come down, opting for an 
orderly debt reduction that  minimises adverse effects  to the economy is  preferable. 
Here the Swedish approach for resolving its banking crisis of 1991-93, where household 
over-indebtedness  was  central,  has  been  portrayed  as  a  successes  story  in  crisis 
management, but the exportability of the model is nevertheless questionable.3  
 
The dilemma facing many countries today is that they are in need of economic growth 
but  at  the  same  time  they  are  being  weighed  down  by  high  debt  burdens  across 
numerous sectors. When great parts of the economy are forced into a savage multi-
sector deleveraging process, which is the case for southern European countries, no one 
                                                              
3 Lars Jonung (2009, The Swedish model for resolving the banking crisis of 1991-93. Seven reasons why it was successful. DG 
ECFIN, European Commission, Brussels (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication14098_en.pdf). 
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is left that can temporarily assume more debt to sustain the economy, as was done in 
Sweden, where aggressive monetary policy and large government spending supported 
the economy from a hard landing. It remains clear, however, that the global magnitude 
of  the  present  financial  crisis  dictates  different  rules  within  a  more  complex 
macroeconomic and financial setting compared to the situation when Sweden designed 
its bank resolution policies. EU policy-makers are therefore facing greater challenges 
today  in  restructuring  and  supporting  a  global  and  interlinked  financial  system. 
However, much is still to be accomplished politically before a smooth deleveraging 
process can be ensured across the sectors of the economy. In Europe it is expected that 
household deleveraging will be a multi-year process that is part of the wider public and 
financial sector deleveraging, and it will require continued liquidity and policy support 
to prevent an excessively rough debt retrenchment that could obstruct the recovery 
path.  
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